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Abstract—A novel anomaly detection procedure is presented,
based on the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) mean-reverting stochastic
process. The considered anomaly is a vessel that deviates from
a planned route, changing its nominal velocity. In order to hide
this behavior, the vessel switches off its Automatic Identification
System (AIS) device for a certain time, and then tries to revert to
the previous nominal velocity. The decision that has to be taken
is either declaring that a deviation happened or not, relying
only upon two consecutive AIS contacts. A proper statistical
hypothesis testing procedure that builds on the changes in the
OU process long-term velocity parameter of the vessel is the
core of the proposed approach and enables for the solution of
the anomaly detection problem.
Index Terms—Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, maritime anomaly
detection, statistical hypothesis test, target tracking, automatic
identification system, maritime security, real-world data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ships involved in stealth activities [1], in which the per-
petrators aim to remain hidden and undetected by law-
enforcement bodies throughout the whole duration of the
activity, tend to follow set patterns depending on the illicit
activity in which they are engaged: deviation from standard
routes, unexpected AIS activity, unexpected port arrival, close
approach, and zone entry [2]. Such set patterns are associated
to an anomalous behavior since the analysis of real-world AIS
data shows that a significant portion of the vessels in open seas
maneuver very seldom, tending to maintain a nearly constant
speed.
Therefore, considering coverage gaps (e.g., counterfeit AIS
reports, AIS device shutdown, limited radar coverage, etc.) an
anomaly detection strategy turns out to be essential.
A real world example of anomalous behavior is provided in
Fig. 1, where the about five-month track of a cargo vessel
is shown. The vessel navigates with a nominal speed of
about 5 m/s in the waters of the Pacific Ocean [3]. Nearby
the Gala´pagos Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the vessel
shuts the engines down and starts drifting, with an apparent
deviation from its route. The reason of this deviation of the
vessel is to rendezvous with four tuna longliners at about 1700
miles away from the Gala´pagos. Each fishing vessel spends
about 12 hours moving along the cargo vessel at a distance
of about 30 m, which indicates the boats were likely tied
Fig. 1. The track of the cargo vessel (red) suspected of several rendezvous
with four fishing vessels (dotted tracks).
up. This behavior suggests a substantial transfer of cargo was
possible [3].
In this work, we consider the anomaly detection problem
where a certain vessel switches off its AIS transponder for a
certain amount of time, in order to hide its deviation from a
planned route, which is characterized by a nominal velocity.
The vessel would then try to revert back to the planned route
and to the original nominal velocity. The decision to take
is whether a deviation happened or not, relying only upon
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Fig. 2. Sequence of long-run mean velocities and time intervals characterizing
the N -section path under hypothesis H1.
two consecutive AIS contacts, i.e. the last contact before
the AIS device shutdown and the first one after the AIS
device reactivation. The extension to the case of other contacts
available from sensors other than AIS is studied in [4]. The
proposed anomaly detection strategy will be tested against a
trajectory of a real transshipment [3] incident, based on a
hypothesis testing procedure that builds on the changes of
the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process long-run mean velocity
parameter.
The OU process has been shown to be better suited to
model the behavior of a significant portion of real-world
vessel trajectories than respect to conventional models [5]–
[11]. In this framework, the use of the OU model turns out
to be a valuable tool when vessel information is not available,
providing a good estimation of a ship’s position and velocity,
even after several hours.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The problem
is formulated in Section II, while Section III is devoted to
the development of the detection strategy, and the analysis of
the real scenario is reported in Section IV. Finally, conclusive
remarks are provided in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let us consider a vessel of interest, represented by a point
in a two-dimensional space, which is following its planned
route. The position and velocity of the vessel are expressed
in Cartesian coordinates, resulting from the projection of
the geographic coordinates reported by the on-board AIS
transponder. The OU stochastic process is used to represent
the velocity of the vessel, with a long-run mean velocity v0
that represents the nominal velocity of the ship [5]. In other
words, the velocity of the vessel is a modified Wiener process
so that there is a tendency of the process to move back towards
the long-run mean value, with a greater attraction when the
process is further away from it. The velocity v0 is therefore a
deterministic parameter of the OU stochastic process [5].
Let us now suppose that AIS data is unavailable for a time
T after a given instant, due to a lack of communications from
the ship (because of limited sensor coverage, interference,
etc.) or an intentional shutdown of the AIS transponder. In
this context, two hypotheses can be envisioned: the first one,
denoted by H0, that the vessel navigates according to the
nominal condition (along the planned trajectory with a long-
run mean velocity v0); and the alternative one, denoted by H1,
that the vessel moves away from the nominal route once the
AIS transponder has been shut down. At the end of the time
interval T , the AIS device is switched back on and the vessel
keeps on moving under the nominal condition, as shown in
Fig. 2.
We assume that, during the time period when a lack of data
occurs, the vessel had been moving according to a sequence
of OU processes with unknown long-run mean velocities or,
equivalently, a single OU process with long-run mean velocity
that is a piecewise-constant function of time. In Fig. 2 it
is shown the sequence of long-run mean velocities, which
identify a N -section path, that we represent with the vector
v1:N =
[
vT1 . . .v
T
N
]T
∈ R2N . Considering the set of time
instants t1 < ... < tn < ... < tN , the period taken to cover
the n-th section corresponds to the difference Δn = tn−tn−1.
In other words, under H1, the vessel velocity is modeled
as a piecewise OU model, i.e. an OU process with a long-run
mean velocity parameter that is a piecewise-constant function
of time. The time period T , during which the AIS is disabled,
can be expressed as the sum of all the different time intervals
Δn, so that T =
∑N
n=1Δn.
The considered problem amounts determining, in absence of
AIS data and without any other information during the time
interval T , whether the vessel has been following the planned
trajectory at the nominal velocity v0 or not, by means of a
composite hypothesis testing formulation designed to identify
changes in the velocity parameter.
III. DETECTION STRATEGY
A. Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) model
Validated against a real-world commercial maritime traffic
dataset, the OU model enables a more accurate representation
of the target state in the long term, when ships are not
maneuvering [5]. The OU process is distinguished from the
conventional nearly-constant velocity (NCV) model mainly by
a feedback loop, which ensures that the velocity of the target
does not diverge with time, but is instead bounded around
a desired value, i.e. the velocity of the process tends to drift
over time towards its long-term mean. Let us indicate the four-
dimensional target state at time t ∈ R+0 with
s(t) = [x(t) x˙(t)]
T
, (1)
where x(t) and x˙(t) denote the target position and velocity,
respectively, in a two-dimensional Cartesian reference system
x(t)
Δ
= [x(t) y(t)] , x˙(t)
Δ
= [x˙(t) y˙(t)] . (2)
The target dynamics, in general, are modeled by a set of
linear stochastic differential equations (SDEs) [12], and in
[5] it is shown how the movement of real non-maneuvering
vessels in the open sea can be represented by a mean-reverting
stochastic process. Specifically, the velocity of the target is
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an OU process, and its position is an Integrated OU (IOU)
process. Under this assumption, the SDE for the target motion
model has the following form
ds(t) = A s(t) dt+G v dt+B dω(t), (3)
where v = [vx vy]
T
is the long-run process mean, and ω(t)
is a standard bi-dimensional Wiener process. The matrices A,
B and G are defined as:
A =
[
0 I
0 −Θ
]
, B =
[
0
Σ
]
, G =
[
0
Θ
]
, (4)
where 0 is a 2×2 null matrix, Σ is a 2×2 matrix defining the
noise process and Θ is a 2× 2 matrix quantifying the mean-
reversion effect, meaning the rate at which the target will tend
back to the desired velocity after a perturbation; its diagonal
terms refer to the x and y components, while the off-diagonals
quantify the coupling effect.
Unless otherwise stated, we will use hereafter subscripted
indices to denote time dependency, i.e. xn = x(tn), x˙n =
x˙(tn) and sn = s(tn) by definition. We also assume that
Θ is diagonalizable and has positive eigenvalues, so that an
affine transformation can be found that projects the matrix
Θ onto another space, i.e. Θ = RΓR−1, where R is the
matrix whose columns contain the eigenvectors of Θ and Γ
is a diagonal matrix whose elements are the corresponding
eigenvalues. This idea is expanded further in [5], where the
general solution to the coupled problem is provided. For the
sake of simplicity and without loss of generality we assume
that R = I, so that Θ = Γ = diag(γ), with γ = [γx, γy]
T. In
other words, as described in [5], there are three parameters for
each coordinate: the long-run mean velocity v, the reversion
rate γ and the process noise σ.
The model can be easily extended to the case of waypoint
navigation [7], that is relevant to our application, being the
navigation mode of substantially all the commercial maritime
traffic. Under this case, we can assume that the long-run
mean velocity of the target is a piecewise-constant function
of the time that takes values from a sequence v1, . . . ,vN .
Along the navigational legs, the long-run mean velocity of the
target follows, by all means, an OU process; conversely, the
maneuver is represented by a change of the long-run mean
velocity parameter. Under these assumptions, the target state
at time ti, given the target state at the previous i − 1 times
can be written, in matrix form as
si = Φ(ti − ti−1,γ)si−1 +Ψ(ti − ti−1,γ)vi + ωi, (5)
where vi is the long-run mean velocity in the time interval
Δi = [ti−1, ti] and ωi = ω(Δi) is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable with covariance C(Δi) defined in [5]. The
state transition matrix and the control input function, Φ(Δ,γ)
and Ψ(Δ,γ), respectively, are defined as
Φ(Δi,γ) =
[
I
(
I− e−ΓΔi
)
Γ−1
0 e−ΓΔi
]
, (6)
Ψ(Δi,γ) =
[
ΔiI−
(
I− e−ΓΔi
)
Γ−1
I− e−ΓΔi
]
, (7)
whose derivations are provided in [5].
The target state at time tN , given the target states at the
previous N−1 times can be expressed recursively as (omitting
γ for clarity)
sN = Φ(ΔN )sN−1 +Ψ(ΔN )vN + ωN
= Φ(ΔN ) [Φ(ΔN−1)sN−2 +Ψ(ΔN−1)vN−1 + ωN−1]
+Ψ(ΔN )vN + ωN = ...
= Φ(T )s0 +Ψ(ΔN )vN + ωN+
+
N−1∑
n=1
[
N∏
i=n+1
Φ(Δi)
]
[Ψ(Δn)vn + ωn] , (8)
where we exploited the property of the state transition matrix
by which Φ(Δ1)Φ(Δ2)...Φ(Δn) = Φ(Δ1 +Δ2 + ...+Δn),
∀n = 1, ..., N , that can be derived by inspection from (6).
B. Statistical representation of data based on OU model
The two measurements, denoted with z and z0, are availa-
ble, respectively at time T and time t0
z = s(T ) + n, z0 = s(t0) + n0, (9)
where n and n0 are independent zero-mean Gaussian noises
with covariance matrices Cn and Cn0 , respectively. Clearly,
the measurement noise is independent from the OU process
noise. Given the linearity of (9) and the fact that z is
Gaussian, we can use the following vector of data to avoid
the dependence on s(t0) in z
y = z−Φ(T )z0
= Ψ(ΔN )vN + ωN
+
N−1∑
n=1
[
N∏
i=n+1
Φ(Δi)
]
[Ψ(Δn)vn + ωn]
+ n−Φ(T )n0.
The terms ωn = ω(Δn) are independent zero-mean Gaussian
random variables with covariance C(Δn) [5]. As shown in [4],
it amounts to compute
ω(T )
Δ
=
N−1∑
n=1
[
N∏
i=n+1
Φ(Δi)
]
ω(Δn)+ω(ΔN ) ∼ N (0,C(T ))
(10)
so that y can be recast as follows
y = θ + ω(T ) + n−Φ(T )n0 ∼ N (θ,Cy) , (11)
where the expression of the mean term θ is given by
θ
Δ
=
N−1∑
n=1
[
N∏
i=n+1
Φ(Δi)
]
Ψ(Δn)vn +Ψ(ΔN )vN (12)
while, the covariance matrix is given by
Cy
Δ
= C(T ) +Cn +Φ(T )Cn0Φ(T )
T, (13)
assuming the independence of the terms in (11).
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Fig. 3. Complete AIS track (1st region).
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Fig. 4. Simulated gap in the AIS track (1st region).
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Fig. 5. Test statistic (16) related to the complete AIS track (1st region).
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Fig. 6. Test statistic (16) related to the incomplete AIS track (1st region).
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Fig. 7. Velocity components related to the complete AIS track (1st region).
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Fig. 8. Velocity components related to the incomplete AIS track (1st region).
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Fig. 9. Complete AIS track (2nd region).
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Fig. 10. Simulated gaps in the AIS track (2nd region).
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Fig. 11. Test statistic (16) related to the complete AIS track (2nd region).
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Fig. 12. Test statistic (16) related to the incomplete AIS track (2nd region).
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Fig. 13. Velocity components related to the complete AIS track (2nd region).
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Fig. 14. Velocity components related to the incomplete AIS track (2nd region).
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C. Detection strategy performance
The anomaly detection problem can be traced back to the
following Gaussian composite hypothesis testing problem:{
H0 : y ∼ N (θ0,Cy)
H1 : y ∼ N (θ,Cy)
(14)
where the mean term θ under H1 is given in (12), while,
under the null hypothesis H0, it is possible to show that θ0
Δ
=
Ψ(T )v0 by exploiting the following equality
N−1∑
n=1
[
N∏
i=n+1
Φ(Δi)
]
Ψ(Δn) +Ψ(ΔN ) = Ψ(T ). (15)
The anomaly detection strategy investigated is the Genera-
lized Likelihood Ratio Test (G-LRT) [13]–[15] and, assuming
the matrix Cy is invertible, it is derived as follows,(
θ̂ − θ0
)T
C−1y
(
θ̂ − θ0
) H1
≷
H0
τ, (16)
where θ̂ = y represents the ML estimate for the parameter θ.
The test statistics under the two hypotheses H0 and H1 are
characterized, respectively, by a central and a non-central Chi-
squared distributions, both with d = 4 degrees of freedom,
corresponding to the size of the known parameter θ0. The
detection performance is therefore given by
PFA = Qχ2
d
(τ), (17)
PD = Qχ′2
d
(λ)(τ), (18)
where Qχ2
d
and Q
χ
′2
d
(λ) are the right tail probabilities of the
central and non-central Chi-squared distributions, respectively,
with the following non-centrality parameter
λ = (θ − θ0)
T
C−1y (θ − θ0) . (19)
IV. REAL SCENARIO ANALYSIS
The strategy proposed in this work has been applied to real
AIS data corresponding to the track shown in Fig. 1, where
two regions of anomalous behavior can be identified by simple
visual inspection.
For the application of the detection strategy, the OU para-
meters have been estimated in the path section immediately
preceding the one where the deviation from the nominal
conditions actually happens. Specifically, the estimated values
of the process noise σ, the long-run mean velocity v0, and
the reversion rate γ are reported in Table I.
A. First region
The anomalous behavior in the first region is not very
apparent and short. According to the AIS track, the vessel
seems to shut down the engines and drift for about 14 hours,
then it goes back to the planned route as it can be seen
in the close-up of Fig. 3. Such an anomaly is reflected on
the velocity components shown in Fig. 7, but it is more
visible in Fig. 5 where, during the deviation time, the decision
statistic (16) grows by several orders of magnitude with respect
TABLE I
OU PARAMETERS ESTIMATES
First region Second region
γ
γx 5.89× 10
−3 2.30× 10−4
γy 8.49× 10
−4 4.19× 10−3
σ
σx 2.83× 10
−2 1.13× 10−2
σy 1.84× 10
−2 2.23× 10−2
v0
v0x 5.8743 5.2931
v0y -0.6320 0.0331
to nominal values, exceeding all the values of the threshold
(i.e. for different values of the false alarm probability: PFA ∈{
10−4, 10−6, 10−8
}
).
A gap has been simulated in the AIS track, corresponding to
the anomaly time frame, as depicted in Fig. 4, in order to test
the proposed detection strategy. The detector (16) correctly
reveals the deviation from the nominal condition, using a
threshold selected with PFA = 10
−6, as shown in Fig. 6.
B. Second region
The AIS track of the ship in the second observation window
is shown in Fig. 9 and it does indeed reveal a deviation from
the normal route during a time frame of about 5 days; Fig. 11
displays the test statistic (16), which exceeds the threshold
(plotted for different values of the false alarm probability
in the same range considered for the first region analysis)
corresponding to the deviation from the nominal condition. In
particular, the deviation from the nominal velocity is visible
in Fig. 13 where the velocity components show an apparent
change in that specific time frame.
As done for the first region, the detection strategy is tested
with simulated gaps in AIS data, as shown in Fig. 10, with
the corresponding velocity gaps shown in Fig 14. The first gap
occurs in a section of the trajectory where there is no deviation
from the nominal conditions, while the second one occurs
where the deviation actually happens. From the application
of the detector (16) with PFA = 10
−6, the deviation can be
properly detected while no detection is correctly declared in
the first gap, as shown in Fig. 12.
V. CONCLUSION
A maritime anomaly detection problem has been studied
assuming an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) mean-reverting sto-
chastic motion model for the vessel dynamics. The aim was to
reveal a possible deviation of the vessel under consideration
from its nominal conditions, during an AIS device disable-
ment, relying on a hypothesis testing procedure based on the
generalized likelihood ratio test that builds on the changes in
the OU process long-term velocity parameter.
A closed-form expression has been provided for the de-
tector, the false alarm probability, and the anomaly detection
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probability, expressed in terms of a central and a non-central
chi-squared distributions, respectively.
Finally, the proposed detection strategy has been applied
to two different sections of a real trajectory of a ship that
performs deviations from her nominal route; within the tra-
jectory, data gaps have been simulated in correspondence of
and outside the deviation. The two hypothesized anomalies
appear to be fairly difficult to be identified by the simple
visual inspection of a human operator, who might not be able
to reveal such small-scale deviations within a big picture.
Therefore, the anomaly detection algorithm appears to be
useful also in practical situations, as it could be applied
automatically and simultaneously to several trajectories in
order to reveal possible deviations.
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